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ABSTRACT
The continuing changing nature of conflict and violence in the past two decades, coupled with a decrease in
financial  resources,  catapulted  preventive  diplomacy  to  the  international  community’s  security  agenda.  If
originally the preventive diplomacy doctrine aimed at the short-term goal of preventing violence or conflict
escalation, today it has come to encompass tasks aimed at resolving the underlying issues that cause and fuel
conflict.  In  parallel  –  promptly  deployable  and  cost-effective  –  mediation  has  become a  more  and  more
sophisticated and increasingly deployed instrument of preventive diplomacy. However, there is no consensus in
the  literature  on  how  high-level  mediation  serves  preventive  diplomacy  goals.  The  question  of  whether
preventing conflict means to prevent the onset of (armed) violence in conflict, or whether it makes sense to talk
about  violence prevention  at later  stages of  the conflict’s  cycle,  permeates the evolution of  the preventive
diplomacy doctrine and literature and divides opinion in mediation literature. The following literature review
aims to offer an understanding on how mediation works as a preventive diplomacy instrument by synthesizing
the literature and bridging it with a contemporary understanding of the concept. It does so through a parallel
review of the evolution of the concept of preventive diplomacy and its agenda and conflict mediation literary
debates on mediation timing, strategy and outcomes in conflict prevention. It concludes, first, that high-level
mediation  is  better  equipped  and  understood  as  an  instrument  of  preventive,  rather  than  pre-emptive
mediation, and denotes that while the preventive diplomacy agenda has expanded, mediation literature has
tended to have a narrow view of the extent to which mediation can contribute to preventive diplomacy goals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  strain  put  on  the  international  community’s
peacekeeping capacity  to,  timely  and  adequately,
respond to the multiplication of intrastate conflicts in
the post-Cold War period brought conflict prevention
to  the  fore  of  the  international  peace  and  security
agenda.  Consequently,  preventive  diplomacy
developed  as  a  cost-effective  tool  box on  how  to
intervene in conflicts before they escalate into violent
confrontation.  Additionally,  the  greater  financial
constraints  brought  to  United  Nations  (UN)
member-states by the financial crises of our decade,
further galvanized the Organization’s commitment to
resource  and  advance  its  preventive  diplomacy
agenda  (Muggah  and  White  2013).  The  increasing
interest and investment in preventive diplomacy has
led,  in  parallel,  to  the  development  and  spread  of
mediation  capacities  at  the  UN  and  regional
organizations around the world. The involvement of
a third party,  whether a diplomat acting on his/her
own,  an  envoy  or  representative  appointed  by  an
international organization or state to assist disputing
leaderships to settle or resolve their conflict through
negotiations1, has the capacity to de-escalate conflict
and prevent its  re-escalation by offering disputants
an alternative way of settling their differences (other
than militarized conflict). Additionally, requiring less
resources and funds while carrying less risks to the
human  resources  employed,  mediation  can  be
promptly  deployed.  However,  in  conflict  mediation
literature there is no consensus on when, how and for
what  purpose  mediation  can  be  deployed  as
preventive diplomacy.
Today,  preventive  diplomacy  aims  not  only  at
anticipating  violence  and  persuading  disputants  to
choose dialogue over it, but also to assist disputants
“in laying the foundations for a longer-term process
to  address  the  underlying  causes  of  conflict”  (UN
2011, paragraph 56). However, in conflict literature,
preventive diplomacy is ascribed different capacities
1 This definition of high-level mediation is inspired in Bercovitch’s
(1986) definition  of  international  mediation -  also  referred to  as
elite or track I mediation. The changes to the definition made here
aim  to  not  insulate  mediation  in  the  conflict  management  field
where Bercovitch places it.
and  limitations depending  on  the  “lens”  through
which it is analysed: the resolution, management and
transformation  of  conflict.  The  conflict  resolution,
management  and transformation  traditions  are  not
strictly  defined  categories  or  concepts,  and  their
perspectives on the goals, methods and mechanisms
to  resolve,  manage  and  transform  conflict  overlap.
Generally,  while  conflict  resolution  has  referred  to
the  methods  and  mechanisms  that  resolve  a  given
conflict’s  underlying issues,  conflict  management  is
used  when  focus  is  given  to  limiting,  mitigating
and/or containing a conflict, instead of the necessity
to solve it (Swanström and Weissman 2005).  From
the conflict transformation perspective, on the other
hand,  a  conflict  must  be  transformed  in  order  for
peace,  not  security,  to  be  established,  through
transforming adversarial relationships that emanate
from opposing goals  between disputants  in conflict
(Galtung  2007).  Depending  on  the  tradition  of  the
author,  views  on the advantages  and limitations  of
mediation as a preventive diplomacy instrument vary
accordingly.
By  bringing  these  “lenses”  to  the  reader’s  eye,  the
present review aims to offer an understanding of how
mediation  serves  preventive  diplomacy  aims  by
synthesizing  the literature  and bridging  it  with  the
contemporary  understanding  of  the  doctrine.  The
literature selected focuses on how mediation affects
conflict  before,  during and after  the actual  fighting
periods, which is crucial to ascertaining when and for
what  purpose  it  should  be  practiced  in  order  to
maximize  its  contribution  to  the  prevention  of
conflict  or  violence.  First,  this  paper  reviews  the
evolution of  the  concept  and practice of  preventive
diplomacy in UN Secretary  General  Reports  and in
conflict  literature.  It  then  reviews  the  preventive
diplomacy-related  debate  in  mediation  literature,
namely  the  interconnected  debates  on  mediation
timing  and  mediation  outcomes.  The  evolving
preventive  diplomacy  doctrine is  then compared to
the  advantages  and  limitations  mediation  exhibits
towards the widened preventive diplomacy agenda to
discuss its pre-emptive versus its preventive capacity,
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which is found to better encapsulate and synthesize
the existing debates. It denotes that, while preventive
diplomacy  has  expanded  in  its  objectives  and
mediation  has  gained  primacy  as  an instrument  of
conflict  prevention,  mediation literature has tended
to  narrow  the  extent  to  which  this  instrument  can
contribute to preventive diplomacy goals. 
2. THE EVOLVING PREVENTIVE 
DIPLOMACY DOCTRINE
The  preventive  diplomacy  concept  or  doctrine  was
conceived by United Nations Secretary General Dag
Hammarksjöld  in  reaction  to  a  growing  need for  a
more  effective  response  to  the  multiplication  of
intrastate conflict in 1961. Ever since, its meaning has
been evolving to accompany the challenges posed by
the  complexity  and  unpredictability  of  intrastate
conflict, and the need to contain their regional spread
and escalation.  In conflict  literature and in the UN
Secretary  General’s  reports,  the  understanding  of
preventive diplomacy has shifted from aiming at the
short-term  goals  of  violence  or  conflict  escalation
prevention,  to  encompassing  the  long-term  tasks
needed for the establishment of a peaceful order that
prevents  re-escalation.  If  originally,  the  preventive
diplomacy  doctrine  mirrored  conflict  management
perspectives,  today it  has come to encompass tasks
aimed at  resolving conflict  issues and transforming
disputants’ antagonistic relationships.
Hammarskjöld  first  introduced  the  concept  of
preventive diplomacy as referring to the anticipatory
actions  that  could  be  taken  to  avoid  crises  from
developing  into  full-blown  conflicts  (UN  1961).
However,  it was not until  the end of the Cold War,
when Secretary  General  Boutros  Ghali  put  forward
An Agenda  for  Peace,  that  preventive  diplomacy
began  to  receive  more  explicit  attention  in  the
international  peace  and  security  agenda.  Ghali
defines preventive diplomacy as “to prevent disputes
from  arising  between  parties,  to  prevent  existing
disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the
spread of the latter when they occur” (UN Secretary
General  1992,  paragraph  20).  Conflict  literature,
however,  advised a narrower  view.  To  Lund (1996,
31-36),  both  former  Secretary  Generals  had
attributed  preventive  diplomacy  too  broad  of
definitions  for  it  to  be  a  meaningful  and  useful
concept. His criticism is that the term conflict implies
violence  in  Ghali’s  definition  and,  therefore,
preventive  diplomacy  must  address  a  wider  object:
not only actual  violence but almost any instance of
potential  violence  and,  therefore,  must  act
throughout  the entire lifespan of  a conflict.  On the
risk  of  embracing  too  much  to  mean  anything
significant,  to  the  author,  preventive  diplomacy
needed  a  narrower  focus.  Therefore,  he  defines  a
preventive diplomacy action as one which occurs to
avoid the threat of the use of armed force or armed
coercion  by  states  or  groups,  in  order  to  settle
political  disputes.  Regarding  its  timing,  preventive
diplomacy  operates  between  peacetime  and  crisis
diplomacy at the unstable peace stage of a conflict’s
cycle: before escalation and confrontation, and in de-
escalated  post-conflict  situations  of  negative  peace
where violence or coercion are largely terminated but
peacebuilding  activities  have  been  insufficient  to
generate stable peace and avoid re-escalation. 
In Lund’s understanding, preventive diplomacy aims
at  preventing  escalation  and  re-escalation  during
times of unstable peace. Preventive diplomacy means
both  to  act  pre-emptively  and  preventively,  and
therefore,  is  not  concerned  with  addressing  the
causes  of  escalation  or  contributing  to  conflict
resolution. This point, however, is not consensual in
the literature. Tivayamond (2004) argues preventive
diplomacy  can  aim  both  at  short-term  conflict
management  and  long-term  resolution  aims.  This
distinction is needed in the analysis and research of
preventive  diplomacy.  When  aimed  at  conflict
management,  preventive  diplomacy  acts  towards
defusing  escalation.  It  is  progressively  active  and
continuously  identifying,  as  well  as  treating  the
potential  for  a  dispute  to  thwart  violence.  To  the
author,  preventive diplomacy is a “pro-active” (p.5)
task by nature, which results in conflict resolution by
creating  cooperative  long-standing  relationships
between disputants. 
To  others  yet,  preventing  conflict  re-escalation  has
increasingly been associated with the need to address
the  underlying  roots  of  conflict  and  the  inimical
relationships  groups  in  conflict  develop.
Consequently,  the  literature  has  evolved  to  define
preventive diplomacy aims in broader terms. Miall et
al.  (1999),  for  example,  had  reconciled  preventive
diplomacy  goals  with  conflict  resolution  and
transformation goals. To them, preventive diplomacy
aims  wider  than  conflict  resolution  at  “bringing
parties  together  to  analyse  and  transform  their
dispute”  through  the  use  of  official  or  unofficial
mediation or good offices (pp. 135). In this definition,
transformation and resolution are (deeper) aims that
preventive  diplomacy  serves  in  conflict  prevention.
In this sense, preventive diplomacy is as much at the
heart of conflict prevention as “the effort to resolve a
conflict is at the heart of prevention” (pp. 136). The
conflict  transformation  tradition  defines  preventive
diplomacy  as  a  structural  action,  within  which  the
goals  of  preventing  violence  and the  production  of
constructive  relationships  among  disputants  are
inextricably linked. Wallenstein (1998, 10-12) refers
to these double aims of preventing escalation and re-
escalation  as  short-term  and  long-term.  To  the
author,  short-term  direct  conflict  prevention  must
aspire  to  the  long-term  structural  prevention  of  a
conflict since the goals of preventing the “immediate
avoidance of violence and killing” and the production
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of  “constructive  future  relationships  among
contending  groups”  are  only  analytically  mutually
exclusive and are inextricably linked in practice.  In
this sense, short-term direct conflict prevention must
aspire  to  the  long-term  structural  prevention  of  a
conflict. 
2.1 THE WIDENED PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 
AGENDA
The wider spectrum of action and greater challenge
to  preventive  diplomacy  in  creating  a  “culture  of
prevention” is adopted in 1999 by Secretary General
Kofi  Annan.  Shortly  after,  however,  the  “pre-
emptive” Bush administration military action in Iraq
after  9/11  terrorist  attacks  diverted  any  significant
commitment  or  funding away from the agenda put
forward by the Secretary General at the time. More
recently,  Secretary  General  Ban  Ki  Moon’s  2011
report  to  the  Security  Council  on  Preventive
Diplomacy: Delivering the Results reflects a greater
commitment  by  international  organizations  to
conflict prevention, and the UN’s in particular. Part
of  conflict  prevention  broader  efforts,  preventive
diplomacy  refers  “specifically  to  diplomatic  action
taken at the earliest  possible stage”,  but  one which
“remains  highly  relevant  along  the  entire  conflict
spectrum” (art.1) as part of the effort of persuading
disputants to “choosing dialogue over violence” (art.
41) and in adequately assisting disputants “in laying
the foundations for a longer-term process to address
the  underlying  causes  of  conflict”  (art.  56).
Preventive diplomacy is understood and practiced in
international  organizations  such  as  the  UN,  as
serving  a  multitude  of  conflict  management  and
resolution purposes:  acting both  pre-emptively  and
preventively  towards  the  short-term  goals  of
preventing  conflict  escalation  and violence  and the
structural  changes  that  prevent re-escalation in the
long-term.  For  the  fulfilment  of  these  aims,
international  and  regional  organizations  have
increased  their  preventive  capacities  by  developing
early  warning  systems  and  rapid  response
instruments, such as flexible financing mechanisms,
and the use of special envoys.  The establishment of
the  UN  Mediation  Support  Unit  in  2006  and  the
upsurge in international and regional organization’s
will  to  enhance  their  mediation  capacities,  such  as
the  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in
Europe  (OSCE)  or  European  Union,  and  of  the
African Union (OSCE&UN 2011), signal the centrality
of  mediation  to  preventive  diplomacy.  In  effect,
mediation  processes  multiplied  and diversified  and
mediation  has  become  an  ever-more  sophisticated
and increasingly important instrument of preventive
diplomacy.
3. MEDIATION AS A PREVENTIVE 
DIPLOMACY INSTRUMENT
Mediation  has  the  potential  to  serve  preventive
diplomacy  in  two  ways:  It  offers  disputants  an
alternative  path  to  resolve  their  differences  (other
than  armed  conflict)  and  it  contributes  to  the
emergence  of  a  more  just  and  egalitarian  social
reality. However, whether both short-term and long-
term goals belong to a preventive mediation initiative
is  not  consensual  in  the  literature.  Mediation  has
proven successful in avoiding conflict escalation, but
has  also  contributed  to  the  emergece  of  frozen
conflicts. Conversely, having not always been able to
produce  stable  agreements  between  disputants,
mediation  has  not  always  been  able  to  prevent
violence re-occurrence (Carment et al. 2009).
While  mediation  has  developed  into  a  prime
instrument  of  preventive  diplomacy,  as  it  has  been
already noted, its deployment or initiation in internal
conflicts remains problematic. First, its practice rests
on treating participants  on an equal footing,  which
means treating a government and non-state actors as
such. For the UN, for example, this involves the risk
of  appearing  biased  by  recognizing  the  non-
governmental  groups’  legitimacy  to  seat  at  the
negotiations  table  (Wolter  2007).  Notwithstanding,
due  to  its  capacity  to  keep  disputants  at  the
negotiations table and to avoid a return to fighting,
mediation  is  consensually  understood  in  the
literature  to  be  an  effective  instrument  of  conflict
management  (Bercovitch  1998;  Bercovitch  and
DeRouen  2004).  In  intrastate  conflict  contexts,
disputants’  relationships  are  deteriorated  by
discrimination,  victimization  and  social  hatred,
which reduces their ability, or their will, to cooperate
and agree (Fisher 2001; Richmond 1998). However,
in these conflicts where parties may not want peace,
or  are  unwilling  to  compromise,  even when formal
agreements are reached, violence is prone to re-occur
(Quackenbush  and  Venteicher  2008).  How,  when
and  for  what  purpose  then  is  mediation  useful  to
preventive diplomacy?
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3.1 MEDIATION TIMING AND SHORT-TERM 
PREVENTION
For mediation to be able to prevent the emergence of
a conflict in the first place, Bercovitch (1998) states it
should be undertaken between disputants with well-
defined and legitimate identities and before opposing
factions’ relationships and positions have hardened.
However,  mediation  has  been  much  more
undertaken at later stages in the conflict cycle. Also,
drawing on Zartman’s theory of ripeness of conflict
(2001a), it is believed to be more successful at such
stages  when  the  conflict  is  “drained  out”  and
disputants  can  no  longer  sustain  the  ongoing  war
effort.  However, a preventive action would not allow
the hurting stalemate to occur. Therefore, mediation
timing and success in preventive diplomacy requires
a different logic.
Zartman  (2001b,  5)  agrees  with  the  conflict  trans-
formation  tradition  that  preventive  diplomacy does
not  aim  at  preventing  conflict  all  together,  but
preventing  its  violent  expression.  Ripeness  in
preventive negotiation, he argues, is a product of the
“mutual perception that the costs of early action are
outweighted by the averted cost of future conflict” for
which  the  disputants’  early  awareness  (not  early
warning) of these costs and of the immediate benefits
of negotiating is key. Once the preventive mediation
is initiated, the preventive mediator acts to: change
the parties’ zero-sum perception of the stakes in the
conflict;  change  their  antagonistic  attitudes  into
accommodative  ones;  and  persuade  them  to  alter
their escalatory behaviour. Preventive mediation thus
can  happen  after  the  first  violent  outbreak  in  a
conflict‘s  cycle,  whenever  there  is  an  attempt  to
prevent escalation. To Zartman, therefore, preventive
mediation can be pre-emptive if disputants are aware
that it will be more costly to fight than to negotiate,
thus perceiving a mutually hurting stalemate.
The  when,  or  timing,  of  preventive  mediation
remains,  nonetheless,  problematic  in acting to  pre-
empt  the  first  violent  outburst  in  a  conflict.  It  is
overambitious  to  assume that  when a conflict  is  in
the  process  of  emergence,  the  parties  will  be  well
defined enough to take part in, or willing to accept, a
mediation process. In the case of a war of insurgency,
a government  will  hardly risk allowing a mediation
process  to  legitimize  the  insurgent’s  claims
internationally  and losing  control  over  the conflict.
Furthermore,  the  UN,  for  example,  struggles  with
being an acceptable mediator to the parties because
its members might have a stake in the conflict, or the
Security Council members may be reluctant to place
it  in  the  Council’s  agenda  for  the  same  reason
(Boutellis and Mikulaschek 2012). Even when parties
are  well  defined,  mediators  still  face  the  dilemma
between responding rapidly and waiting for a ‘ripe’
time  when  negotiations  can  be  constructive
(OSCE&UN  2011).  A  recent  study  by  Grieg  (2015)
suggests that, rather than waiting for the right time,
mediators  can affect  the  onset  of  mediation  in low
intensity conflicts by engaging in talks with one of the
sides.  The  rapport  created  with  this  side  and  the
information that  it  allows the prospective mediator
to gather about the conflict, is believed to strengthen
its credibility as an actor and increase the chances of
mediation.
Whether  high-level  conflict  mediation  can  be
deployed pre-emptively seems to be more a function
of effective early warning systems (Bercovitch 1998)
and  political  will.  Also,  irrespectively  of  timing
issues, empirical studies of mediations also run into
the fallacy of it being virtually impossible to know if a
violent  conflict  could have emerged from a dispute
that  was  address  by  mediation.  Nonetheless,
mediation is more frequently employed after the first
manifestation  of  violence  because  it  is  when  the
parties and their leaders are defined and more willing
to  accept  mediation,  which  cannot  be  improved by
early  warning  instruments.  Hence,  it  can be in  de-
escalating  a  conflict  and  in  acting  to  prevent  a
conflict’s  re-escalation  that  mediation  can  be more
useful to preventive diplomacy.
3.2 MEDIATION STRATEGIES AND VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION
To  Beardsley  (2011)  mediation  should  only  be
practiced  when  its  short-term  benefits  of  tension
reduction and of making the bargaining environment
amenable to peace surpass the risk of long-term re-
escalation.  To  the  author,  mediation  generates
artificial  incentives  for  peace  (especially  when
leverage  is  used)  and  when  the  mediator  exits  the
conflict,  instability  tends  to  return.  Therefore,
mediation  actuality  contributes  and  exacerbates
instability  in  the  long-term.  Additionally,  political
leaders may pursue mediation for insincere motives
and  spoiling,  which  further  increases  the  risk  of
mediation contributing to long-term instability. This
dichotomy between mediation’s short-term and long-
term  impact  originates  in  the  debate  regarding
whether mediators should or not leverage (meaning
to apply pressure on) the parties. 
For Kydd (2003), in order to be effective, a mediator
has to be seen as credible by the conflicting parties,
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which means that they must trust that the mediator
is being truthful in the information and counselling
he is  giving.  The argument rests in the assumption
that  if  a  neutral  or  unbiased  mediator  posits  its
greater interest in minimizing the possibility of war,
she/he will have an incentive to make statements to
avoid war and, therefore, will not be trusted by the
parties.  Only  a mediator  who  is  trusted  not  to  use
“cheap talk” and who is believed to be on one parties’
side  will  effectively  induce  the  parties  into
agreement.  However,  as  Frazier  and  Dixon  (2009,
59) point out, while the offer of reward or the threat
of punishment by the mediators are more effective in
bringing  about  settlements,  since  the  parties  have
been  pressured  to  accept  an  agreement,  they  may
perceive  it  as  unfair  and  the  agreement  may  not
endure. Arriving at an agreement is not sine qua non
to  its  implementation  because  the  parties  can  be
reluctant  to  settle  the  conflict  if  they  perceive  the
possibility of exploiting the other party in the future
(Svensson 2009). 
Quinn  et  al.  (2009)  find  that,  even  though  less
intrusive neutral mediation will not be able to induce
compromise  between  the  parties  as  effectively  as
directive mediation, it is more successful in reducing
tensions in the long-run by generating commitment
to  what  was  agreed.  While  high  intervention
strategies  are  the  most  successful  in  preventing
bargaining failures or in effectively securing a formal
agreement,  low  intervention  strategies  are  more
successful  in  resolving  the  parties’  commitment
problems  and  in  reducing  conflict  tensions  in  the
long-run.  Because  they  are  based  on  improving
communication  and  understanding,  the  later  are
more  effective  in  reducing   misconceptions  and
mistrust between the parties in the long-term. Also,
directive or leveraging strategies are unlikely to work
when  the  conflicts’  intensity  is  low  because  they
damage the de-escalated environment. If parties find
the  mediator  to  be  conducive  and  self-interested,
suspect of the mediators’ intentions or the fairness of
an agreement, they may refuse to negotiate or agree
(Bercovitch  and  Gartner  2009).  Therefore,  while
directive  mediators  can be useful  interveners  when
conflict tension escalates, neutral mediators are more
effective  at  working  with  the  parties  in  the
improvement  of  their  relationship  and  the
development of trust (Frazier and Dixon 2009).
Drawing  on  existing  literature,  while  leveraging
strategies are more effective in reducing tensions and
keeping  parties  at  the  negotiations  table  when
tensions are high, less intrusive strategies are more
effective at preventing re-escalation in the long-run.
However,  according  to  Zartman  (2001),  preventive
mediation  aims  foremost  at  preventing  conflict
escalation  and,  therefore,  to  affect  disputants’
relationships is an unmanageable goal for preventive
mediation, while an opposing perspective is given by
Miall  et  al.  (1999).  To  the  later,  regardless  of  the
timing  in  which  they  are  deployed,  preventive
diplomacy  measures  must  also  be  effective  in
generating the necessary conditions for violence not
to re-emerge in the longer-run, to which mediation
contributes  by  helping  parties  come  together  to
analyse  and  transform  their  adversarial
relationships.
3.3 MEDIATION OUTCOMES AND LONG-TERM 
PREVENTION
Mediation’s  capacity  to  manage  a  conflict  is
somewhat consensual in the literature, but whether it
is effective in resolving or transforming a conflict is
still  in debate.  While  negotiations  tend to  focus  on
finite and divisible interests and not on abstract and
complex  values  and  identity  issues,  the  later
characterize intrastate conflict. Therefore, mediation
is considered unable to solve deep-rooted grievances
and  disagreements  between  disputants  with
irreconcilable interests (Väyryen 1999,; Fisher 2001).
Consequently,  mediation  is  criticized  by  conflict
resolution literature for being limited in the sources
of  conflict  it  is  able  to  address  and,  also,  for
producing  elite  pacts  with  institutions  that  are  too
rigid to allow for change on those social and political
circumstances  that  caused  the  conflict  in  the  first
place (Lederach 1997, Kaldor 2000). 
To  avoid  the  re-escalation  of  conflict  during
agreement  implementation,  Sisk  (2003)  suggests
that settlements be designed not to be finished deals,
but rather as a set of rules for future interaction that
will  need  ongoing  bargaining  or  renegotiation.
However,  to strike such a deal, there needs to be a
sufficient  improvement  of  the  relationship  between
the parties, so that enough trust is developed to allow
for  the  necessary  re-negotiation  periods  the
implementation  of  the  flexible  agreement  will
require. 
To  Sisk  (2001),  the  main  role  of  mediation  in
preventive diplomacy is  to prevent  a peace process
from  de-railing,  to  which  spoiler  management
becomes  essential.  A  spoiler  (Stedman  1997)  is  a
leader who perceives a peace process as threatening
to its  power,  worldview,  or interests,  and who uses
violence to undermine it. It has been found, however,
that,  first,  parties  may not  use  violence  necessarily
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because they do not desire peace. Successful spoiling
impacts  the  peace  process  in  multiple  ways:
introducing  new  issues,  diverting  attention,
providing marginalized groups with a voice, delaying
or  postponing  talks,  preventing  implementation  or
bringing  new  actors  into  the  talks  (Newman  and
Richmond  2007,  109).  Secondly,  spoilers  may  use
violence for reasons that  are not clearly directed at
derailing  the peace process,  such as  to  signal  their
desire  to  be at  the  negotiations  table  or  to  express
concerns  over  the  agreements’  implementation
process (Zahar 2010, 270). Thirdly, spoiling may not
be entirely negative since it  may be a sign that  the
process is progressing and marginalized groups fear
losing  their  marginal  relevance  with  the  conflict’s
ending  (Newman  and  Richmond  2007)  and  also,
violence  has  been  recognized  to  have  destroyed
insipient  coalitions  for  peace  or  to  have  pushed
parties  into  settlement  (Stedman  2009,  103,  104).
Fourthly, spoiling can be both directed at continuing
violent  conflict  and  at  prolonging  negotiations
(Newman and Richmond 2007). In this perspective,
spoiling gains a broader definition, including parties
who may take part in the peace process but are not
seriously  committed  to  finding  or  supporting  the
solution. 
Since, first, spoiling is a source of conflict escalation
and, secondly, it is a continued threat to the stability
and  success  of  a  peace  process  and,  therefore,  a
source of conflict re-escalation, to identify the causes,
the  agents  and  the  effects  of  this  phenomenon
become  crucial  to  preventive  mediation.  The
complexity and unpredictably of spoiling challenges
the mediator’s decision on who to bring to the table.
To Stedman (1997), while limited and greedy spoilers
should be included in the negotiations, total spoilers
are committed only to terminating the peace process
and should not be included by the mediator.  Zahar
(2003,  114)  contests  Stedman’s  typology  on  the
grounds that the attempt to profile a given actor as a
spoiler  ex ante is  risky and does  not  consider  that
groups’ attitudes and positions are not fixed. To the
author, a mediation process’ inclusiveness is crucial
to  the  creation  of  sustainable  peace  in  order  to
prevent  parties  from  having  incentives  to  renege
during settlement implementation. 
The literature has so far assessed that the challenge
to  preventive  mediation  effectiveness  in  preventing
re-escalation is, first, to be inclusive while preventing
spoilers  from  derailing  negotiations  or  agreement
implementation.  Secondly,  the  agreement  produced
must be flexible to allow for continuous negotiations,
to which end the mediator must balance the parties’
needs  for  immediate  security  guaranties  with  the
need to push for the creation of flexible institutions
that forge political cooperation and reconciliation in
the  longer-run.  Additionally,  an  active  civil  society
has  been  found  to  be  fundamental  to  peace
settlement  implementation  and  durable  peace
(Nilsson, 2012). Inclusivity has become a major focus
of  attention  in  the  literature  in  recent  years  as
mediation  processes  have  become  more  porous.
Inclusivity  has  stretched  to  mean  not  only  the
inclusion  of  political  stakeholders,  but  also  the
inclusion  or  consultation  of  civil  society  during
negotiations  or  the  use  of  public  diplomacy
instruments,  such  as  public  opinion  polls  (Irwin
2003)  or  “participatory  polling”  (Interpeace  2014).
These more recent  emerging debates  have unveiled
how mediation processes can generate the multi-level
political  engagement  and  interaction  necessary  for
reconciliation. 
4. CONCLUSION: PRE-EMPTIVE OR 
PREVENTIVE MEDIATION?
The  continuing  changing  nature  of  conflict  and
violence  in  the  past  two  decades,  coupled  with  a
decrease in financial resources, catapulted preventive
diplomacy to the international community’s security
agenda.  The  growing  challenge  of,  not  only
preventing  the  emergence  of  conflict,  but  also  of
preventing violence re-escalation, has come to widen
the spectrum of  preventive diplomacy aims. Today,
its  agenda  has  stretched  from  aiming  not  only  to
manage  conflicts  in  order  to  prevent  violence,  but
also to address the underlying issues that keep them
re-igniting. Since mediation is able to contribute fully
to the widened preventive diplomacy challenges with
the least cost and risk to human lives, resources have
been  increasingly  channelled  to  develop  mediation
units  and  train  mediators  in  regional  organization
around the world.
The  when,  how  and  purpose  of  mediation  as
preventive diplomacy are inexorably linked. Drawing
on  existing  literature,  mediation  is  successful  as  a
preventive  diplomacy  instrument  when  bringing
disputants to the negotiations table to prevent their
conflict from escalating to violent confrontation and,
secondly,  by keeping the parties at the negotiations
table.  While leveraging strategies are more effective
in preventing escalation, less intrusive strategies that
aim at improving the disputant’s communication and
relationship  have  a  higher  re-escalation  preventive
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capacity.  Mediation  has,  therefore,  the  potential
ability  of  converting  short-term  tension  reduction
into  long-term  stability  by  designing  a  flexible
agreement  best  suited  to  prevent  implementation
spoiling  and  re-escalation.  The  crucial  steps  and
major  challenges  to  effective  preventive  mediation
are in getting the parties to accept mediation in the
first place to prevent the first violent manifestations;
when the former is not possible or unsuccessful,  to
become a viable alternative to conflict to disputants;
be  able  to  manage  spoilers  efforts  or  attempts,
whether violent or non-violent, to terminate or affect
negotiations;  and,  in  the  process  of  spoiler
management,  to  be  able  to  devise  a  sustainable
agreement  that  will  prevent  re-escalation  in  the
future.
However,  as  a  pre-emptive  form  of  preventive
diplomacy,  it  seems  overambitious  to  assume  that
when  an  intrastate  conflict  is  in  the  process  of
emergence, the parties will be well defined enough to
take part in, or willing to accept, a mediation process.
The timing of preventive mediation is dependent not
on the availability of the offer to mediate but on the
disputants’ cost-benefit calculations of the benefits of
negotiating  now  or  incurring  the  future  costs  of
fighting.  As  a  preventive  diplomacy  instrument,
mediation can rapidly be deployed, but only if there
is  a  local  political  preventive  will.  Furthermore,
especially  in  conflicts  where  the  government  is  a
disputant,  it  will  be  unlikely  to  accept  the
involvement of an external actor. On the other hand,
as the UN mediation in Libya continues to struggle
with, groups may also have no incentive to sit at the
table.  Furthermore,  the  changing  sources  and
character of violence also further limits mediation as
preventive  diplomacy  when  violence  is  used  by
terrorist  organizations.  Legitimizing  the  claims  of
organized  groups  who  use  terror  and the  potential
advantage  of  stopping  violence  by  sitting  their
leaders at a negotiations table is an ongoing debate in
the literature (see in eg. Zartman and Feure 2009).
Mediation  can  serve  preventive  diplomacy  by
defusing conflicts, however, due to the characteristics
and  implication  of  its  initiation  and  practice,  its
deployment  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  aim  of
changing the sociologic structures of conflict and the
long-term commitment that they require. To prevent
conflict  re-escalation,  despite  the  timing  in  which
they  are  deployed,  preventive  diplomacy  measures
must  also  be  effective  in  generating  the  necessary
conditions  for  violence  not  to  re-emerge  in  the
longer-run.  An  intervention  in  a  given  conflict  is
bound to  affect  its  course  and can,  in  fact,  worsen
rather than ameliorate its propensity to violence. As a
result,  mediation  as  a  preventive  diplomacy
instrument  must  aim  both  at  conflict  management
and  resolution.  Yet,  others  claim,  that  a  deeper
societal  transformation  setting  the  grounds  for
enduring peace is needed for preventive diplomacy to
be  effective.  While  the  conflict  transformation  and
mediation literature is generally sceptical to the role
high-level  mediation  plays  in  such  transformation,
the  inclusion  of  civil  society  in  negotiations  and
engaging  in  the  public  is  being  recognized  as
contributing  to  stable  agreements  and  endurable
peace.  In  effect,  as  the  concept  of  preventive
diplomacy  and  its  agenda  widens  to  prevent  re-
escalation by effectively and durably solving conflicts,
mediation can continue to prove itself a reliable and
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